They are usually scaled graphic depictions of threat dispositions for a particular type of standard operation, such as a battalion movement to contact, an insurgent ambush, or a terrorist kidnapping.The best terrain analysis is based on a reconnaissance of the AO and AI.
This is usually an overlay with areas of poor observation and fields of fire marked by parallel diagonal lines or cross-hatching.Allowing the commander to quickly choose and exploit the terrain (and associated weather, politics, economics) that best supports the friendly mission.
Combine the results of evaluating defensible terrain with the results of evaluating observation and fields of fire to identify potential engagement areas.The friendly commander and staff will avoid being surprised with an unanticipated threat action.
The remainder of this chapter describes each step of the IPB process in detail.Such a division accommodates the types of information relevant in each AI as well as their usually different geographical limits.If you are not directly supported by a weather team, request support from your higher headquarters.Association for Community Organization and Social Administration.Disseminate the results of terrain analysis in the analysis of the AO, the intelligence estimate, and in graphic products that will aid the staff in the completion of their own estimates and plans.The areas where you expect key events to occur are called NAIs.
For example, he might conduct economy of force operations in some sectors in order to generate sufficient combat power for offensive operations in others.Each threat COA must be significantly different from the others.Vital signs are never stagnant,. patients who are unconscious or present difficulty with oral temperature measurement related to cognitive function.
Laminate Wood Flooring - Laminate Flooring - The Home DepotEnsure you depict the locations and activities of the HVTs listed in the threat model.Examine the events associated with each NAI on the event template and restate them in the form of indicators.They are the most useful products in allowing other commands and staff sections to develop their own more detailed or specialized threat COA models.
Important road junctions or communication centers which affect the use of reserves, sustainment. or LOCs.Develop threat models which accurately portray how threat forces normally execute operations and how they have reacted to similar situations in the past.Factors that limit or deny observation include concealment and cover.The evaluation of concealment and cover aids in identifying defensible terrain, possible approach routes, assembly areas, and deployment and dispersal areas.History repeatedly demonstrates that those who predict only one COA are often surprised by the enemy.
Doctrinal templates are tailored to the needs of the unit or staff section creating them.For example, in scenario 3 of Chapter 3, the S2 uses three reports of recent insurgent ambushes to create a threat model depicting an insurgent ambush (see Figure 3-3-12 ).Evaluate actual movement rates, as revealed in the data base, with written doctrine.This report assesses changes in the structure and attitudes of the American.An AA is an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path.Use a two step process to determine the effects of other characteristics of the battlefield.The best mobility corridors use UNRESTRICTED terrain that provides enough space for a force to move in its preferred doctrinal formations while avoiding major obstacles.Address the concept of operation and how it is supported, not just the disposition of forces.A field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may effectively cover with fire from a given position.
North Okanagan Initiatives, Partners and Resources, Sites of Interest.A force that has never trained in large scale troop movements may have a limited capability to conduct large offensive maneuvers.This report was prepared by the Family Violence and the Military Community.Inform the commander if you confirm assumptions made during the initial mission analysis and IPB process.Realizing that the information will probably arrive too late to support initial planning, the J2 discusses with the commander reasonable assumptions for use during planning.They are based on the ability of a force to maneuver in combat formations, usually linear, or to transition from one type formation to another, as opposed to simply moving through a piece of terrain.Weather has both direct and indirect effects on military operations.